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Abstract
We investigate conditions under which test statis-
tics exist that can reliably detect examples, which
have been adversarially manipulated in a white-
box attack. These statistics can be easily com-
puted and calibrated by randomly corrupting in-
puts. They exploit certain anomalies that adversar-
ial attacks introduce, in particular if they follow
the paradigm of choosing perturbations optimally
under p-norm constraints. Access to the log-odds
is the only requirement to defend models. We
justify our approach empirically, but also provide
conditions under which detectability via the sug-
gested test statistics is guaranteed to be effective.
In our experiments, we show that it is even possi-
ble to correct test time predictions for adversarial
attacks with high accuracy.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been used with great success for
perceptual tasks such as image classification (Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014; LeCun et al., 2015) or speech recognition
(Hinton et al., 2012). While they are known to be robust to
random noise, it has been shown that the accuracy of deep
nets can dramatically deteriorate in the face of so-called
adversarial examples (Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al.,
2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014), i.e. small perturbations of
the input signal, often imperceptible to humans, that are
sufficient to induce large changes in the model output.
A plethora of methods have been proposed to find adver-
sarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016;
Sabour et al., 2015). These often transfer across different
architectures, enabling black-box attacks even for inacces-
sible models (Papernot et al., 2016; Kilcher & Hofmann,
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2017; Trame`r et al., 2017). This apparent vulnerability is
worrisome as deep nets start to proliferate in the real-world,
including in safety-critical deployments.
The most direct and popular strategy of robustification is to
use adversarial examples as data augmentation during train-
ing (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry
et al., 2017), which improves robustness against specific
attacks, yet does not address vulnerability to more cleverly
designed counter-attacks (Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a). This raises the question of whether one
can protect models with regard to a wider range of possible
adversarial perturbations.
A different strategy of defense is to detect whether or not
the input has been perturbed, by detecting characteristic reg-
ularities either in the adversarial perturbations themselves
or in the network activations they induce (Grosse et al.,
2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2017; Metzen et al.,
2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a). In this spirit, we propose
a method that measures how feature representations and
log-odds change under noise: If the input is adversarially
perturbed, the noise-induced feature variation tends to have
a characteristic direction, whereas it tends not to have any
specific direction if the input is natural. We evaluate our
method against strong iterative attacks and show that even
an adversary aware of the defense cannot evade our detec-
tor. E.g. for an L8-PGD white-box attack on CIFAR10,
our method achieves a detection rate of 99% (FPR ă 1%),
with accuracies of 96% on clean and 92% on adversarial
samples respectively. On ImageNet, we achieve a detec-
tion rate of 99% (FPR 1%). Our code can be found at
https://github.com/yk/icml19_public.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a statistical test for the detection and clas-
sification of adversarial examples.
• We establish a link between adversarial perturbations
and inverse problems, providing valuable insights into
the feature space kinematics of adversarial attacks.
• We conduct extensive performance evaluations as well
as a range of experiments to shed light on aspects of
adversarial perturbations that make them detectable.
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2. Related Work
Iterative adversarial attacks. Adversarial perturbations
are small specifically crafted perturbations of the input, typ-
ically imperceptible to humans, that are sufficient to induce
large changes in the model output. Let f be a probabilistic
classifier with logits fy and let F pxq “ arg maxy fypxq.
The goal of the adversary is to find an Lp-norm bounded
perturbation 4x P Bp p0q :“ t4 : ||4||p ď u, where 
controls the attack strength, such that the perturbed sample
x `4x gets misclassified by the classifier F pxq. Two of
the most iconic iterative adversarial attacks are:
Projected Gradient Descent (Madry et al., 2017) aka Basic
Iterative Method (Kurakin et al., 2016):
x0 „ UpBp pxqq (1)
xt` 1 “ ΠB8 pxq
`
xt´α signp∇xLpf ;x, yq|xtq
˘ rL8s
xt` 1 “ ΠB2 pxq
´
xt´α ∇xLpf ;x, yq|xt|| ∇xLpf ;x, yq|xt ||2
¯
rL2s
where the second and third line refer to the L8- and L2-
norm variants respectively, ΠS is the projection operator
onto the set S, α is a small step-size, y is the target label
and Lpf ;x, yq is a suitable loss function. For untargeted
attacks y “ F pxq and the sign in front of α is flipped, so as
to ascend the loss function.
Carlini-Wagner attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b):
minimize ||4x||p ` cFpx`4xq
such that x`4x P domx
(2)
where F is an objective function, defined such that Fpx`
4xq ď 0 if and only if F px ` 4xq “ y, e.g. Fpxq “
maxpmaxtfzpxq : z ‰ yu ´ fypxq,´κq (see Section V.A
in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) for a list of objective functions
with this property) and domx denotes the data domain, e.g.
domx “ r0, 1sD. The constant c trades off perturbation
magnitude (proximity) with perturbation strength (attack
success rate) and is chosen via binary search.
Detection. The approaches most related to our work are
those that defend a machine learning model against adver-
sarial attacks by detecting whether or not the input has been
perturbed, either by detecting characteristic regularities in
the adversarial perturbations themselves or in the network
activations they induce (Grosse et al., 2017; Feinman et al.,
2017; Xu et al., 2017; Metzen et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017;
Li & Li, 2017; Lu et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a).
Notably, Grosse et al. (2017) argue that adversarial exam-
ples are not drawn from the same distribution as the natural
data and can thus be detected using statistical tests. Metzen
et al. (2017) propose to augment the deep classifier net with
a binary “detector” subnetwork that gets input from interme-
diate feature representations and is trained to discriminate
between natural and adversarial network activations. Fein-
man et al. (2017) suggest to detect adversarial examples by
testing whether inputs lie in low-confidence regions of the
model either via kernel density estimates in the feature space
of the last hidden layer or via dropout uncertainty estimates
of the classfier’s predictions. Xu et al. (2017) propose to
detect adversarial examples by comparing the model’s pre-
dictions on a given input with its predictions on a squeezed
version of the input, such that if the difference between the
two exceeds a certain threshold, the input is considered to
be adversarial. A quantitative comparison with the last two
methods can be found in the Experiments Section.
Origin. It is still an open question whether adversarial exam-
ples exist because of intrinsic flaws of the model or learning
objective or whether they are solely the consequence of non-
zero generalization error and high-dimensional statistics
(Gilmer et al., 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018).
We note that our method works regardless of the origin of
adversarial examples: as long as they induce characteristic
regularities in the feature representations of a neural net, e.g.
under noise, they can be detected.
3. Identifying and Correcting Manipulations
3.1. Perturbed Log-Odds
We work in a multiclass setting, where pairs of inputs
x˚ P <D and class labels y˚ P t1, . . . ,Ku are generated
from a data distribution P. The input may be subjected
to an adversarial perturbation x “ x˚ ` 4x such that
F pxq ‰ y˚ “ F px˚q, forcing a misclassification. A well-
known defense strategy against such manipulations is to
voluntarily corrupt inputs by noise before processing them.
The rationale is that by adding noise η „ N, one may be
able to recover the original class, if Pr tF px` ηq “ y˚u is
sufficiently large. For this to succeed, one typically utilizes
domain knowledge in order to construct meaningful families
of random transformations, as has been demonstrated, for
instance, in (Xie et al., 2017; Athalye & Sutskever, 2017).
Unstructured (e.g. white) noise, on the other hand, does
typically not yield practically viable tradeoffs between prob-
ability of recovery and overall accuracy loss.
We thus propose to look for more subtle statistics that can
be uncovered by using noise as a probing instrument and
not as a direct means of recovery. We will focus on proba-
bilistic classifiers with a logit layer of scores as this gives
us access to continuous values. For concreteness we will
explicitly parameterize logits via fypxq “ xwy, φpxqy with
class-specific weight vectors wy on top of a feature map φ
realized by a (trained) deep network. Note that typically
F pxq “ arg maxy fypxq. We also define pairwise log-odds
between classes y and z, given input x
fy,zpxq “ fzpxq ´ fypxq “ xwz´wy, φpxqy . (3)
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We are interested in the noise-perturbed log-odds fy,zpx`ηq
with η „ N, where y “ y˚, if ground truth is available,
e.g. during training, or y “ F pxq, during testing.
Note that the log-odds may behave differently for different
class pairs, as they reflect class confusion probabilities that
are task-specific and that cannot be anticipated a priori. This
can be addressed by performing a Z-score standardization
across data points x and perturbations η. For each fixed
class pair py, zq define:
gy,zpx, ηq :“ fy,zpx` ηq ´ fy,zpxq
µy˚,z :“ Ex˚|y˚Eη
“
gy˚,zpx˚, ηq
‰
σ2y˚,z :“ Ex˚|y˚Eη
“pgy˚,zpx˚, ηq ´ µy˚,zq2‰
g¯y,zpx, ηq :“ rgy,zpx, ηq ´ µy,zs {σy,z .
(4)
In practice, all of the above expectations are computed by
sample averages over training data and noise instantiations.
Also, note that gy,zpx, ηq “ xwz´wy, φpx ` ηq ´ φpxqy,
i.e. our statistic measures noise-induced feature map weight-
difference vector alignment, cf. Section 4.
3.2. Log-Odds Robustness
The main idea pursued in this paper is that the robustness
properties of the perturbed log-odds statistics are different,
dependent on whether x “ x˚ is naturally generated or
whether it is obtained through an (unobserved) adversarial
manipulation, x “ x˚ `4x.
Firstly, note that it is indeed very common to use (small-
amplitude) noise during training as a way to robustify
models or to use regularization techniques which improve
model generalization. In our notation this means that for
px˚, y˚q „ P, it is a general design goal – prior to even con-
sidering adversarial examples – that with high probability
fy˚,zpx˚ ` ηq « fy˚,zpx˚q, i.e. that log-odds with regard
to the true class remain stable under noise. We generally
may expect fy˚,zpx˚q to be negative (favoring the correct
class) and slightly increasing under noise, as the classifier
may become less certain.
Secondly, we posit that for many existing deep learning
architectures, common adversarial attacks find perturbations
4x that are not robust, but that overfit to specifics of x. We
elaborate on this conjecture below by providing empirical
evidence and theoretical insights. For the time being, note
that if this conjecture can be reasonably assumed, then
this opens up ways to design statistical tests to identify
adversarial examples and even to infer the true class label,
which is particularly useful for test time attacks.
Consider the case of a test time attack, where we sus-
pect an unknown perturbation 4x has been applied such
that F px˚ ` 4xq “ y ‰ y˚. If the perturbation is
not robust w.r.t. the noise process, then this will yield
Figure 1. Change of logit scores fy (on the vertical axis) and fz
(on the horizontal axis) when adding noise to an adversarially
perturbed example x “ x˚ `4x. Light red dot: x. Other red
dots: x` η, with color coding of noise amplitude (light “ small,
dark “ large). Light blue dot: x˚. Different plots correspond to
different candidate classes z. The candidate class in the green box
is selected by Equation 6 and the plot magnified in the lower left.
fy,y˚px` ηq ą fy,y˚pxq, meaning that noise will partially
undo the effect of the adversarial manipulation and direction-
ally revert the log-odds towards the true class y˚ in a way
that is statistically captured in the perturbed log-odds. Fig-
ure 1 (lower left corner) shows this reversion effect. Figure 2
shows an experiment performed on the CIFAR10 data set,
which confirms that the histograms of standardized log-odds
g¯y,zpxq (defined below) show a good spearation between
clean data x˚ and manipulated data points x “ x˚ `4x.
3.3. Statistical Test & Corrected Classification
We propose to use the expected perturbed log-odds
g¯y,zpxq “ Eη rg¯y,zpx, ηqs as statistics to test whether x
classified as y should be thought of as a manipulated ex-
ample of (true) class z or not. To that extent, we define
thresholds τy,z , which guarantee a maximal false detection
rate (of say 1%), yet maximize the true positive rate of
identifying adversarial examples. We then flag an example
px, y :“ F pxqq as (possibly) manipulated, if
max
z‰y tg¯y,zpxq ´ τy,zu ě 0 , (5)
otherwise it is considered clean.
For test time attacks, it may be relevant not only to detect
manipulations, but also to correct them on the spot. The
simplest approach is to define a new classifier G via
Gpxq “ arg max
z
tg¯y,zpxq ´ τy,zu , y :“ F pxq . (6)
Here we have set τy,y “ g¯y,y “ 0, which sets the correct
reference point consistent with Equation 5.
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Figure 2. Histograms of the test statistic g¯y,zpxq aggregated over
all data points in the training set. Blue represents natural data, or-
ange represents adversarially perturbed data. Columns correspond
to predicted labels y, rows to candidate classes z.
A more sophisticated approach is to build a second level
classifier on top of the perturbed log-odds statistics. We
performed experiments with training a logistic regression
classifier for each class y on top of the standardized log-odds
scores g¯y,zpxq, y “ F pxq, z ‰ y. We found this to further
improve classification accuracy, especially in cases where
several Z-scores are comparably far above the threshold.
See Section 7.1 in the Appendix for further details.
4. Feature Space Analysis
4.1. Optimal Feature Space Manipulation
The feature space view allows us to characterize the optimal
direction of manipulation for an attack targetting some class
z. Obviously the log-odds fy˚,z only depend on a single
direction in feature space, namely4wz “ wz ´ wy˚ .
Proposition 1. For constraint sets B that are closed under
orthogonal projections, the optimal attack in feature space
takes the form4φ˚ “ αpwz ´ wy˚q for some α ě 0.
Proof. Assume 4φ P B is optimal. We can decompose
4φ “ α4wz ` v, where v K 4wz . 4φ˚ achieves the
same change in log-odds as4φ and is also optimal.
Proposition 2. If4φ s.t. y “ arg maxzxwz, φpxq `4φy
and y˚ “ arg maxzxwz, φpxqy, then x4φ,4wyy ě 0.
Proof. Follows directly from φ-linearity of log-odds.
Now, as we treat the deep neural net defining φ as a black
box device, it is difficult to state whether a (near-)optimal
feature space attack can be carried out by manipulating in
the input space via 4x ÞÑ 4φ. However, we will use
some DNN phenomenology as a starting point for making
reasonable assumptions that can advance our understanding.
4.2. Pre-Image Problems
The feature space view suggests to search for a pre-image
of the optimal manipulation φpxq `4φ˚ or at least a ma-
nipulation 4x such that }φpxq `4φ˚ ´ φpx `4xq}2 is
small. A naı¨ve approach would be to linearize φ at x and
use the Jacobian,
φpx`4xq “ φpxq ` Jφpxq4x`Op}4x}2q . (7)
Iterative improvements could then be obtained by inverting
(or pseudo-inverting) Jφpxq, but are known to be plagued
by instabilities. A popular alternative is the so-called Jaco-
bian transpose method from inverse kinematics (Buss, 2004;
Wolovich & Elliott, 1984; Balestrino et al., 1984). This can
be motivated by a simple observation
Proposition 3. Given an input x as well as a target direc-
tion 4φ in feature space. Define 4x :“ JJφ pxq4φ and
assume that xJφ4x,4φy ą 0. Then there exists an  ą 0
(small enough) such that x` :“ x ` 4x is a better pre-
image in that }φpxq `4φ´ φpx`q} ă }4φ}.
Proof. Follows from Taylor expansion of φ.
It turns out that by the chain rule, we get for any loss `
defined in terms of features φ,
∇xp` ˝ φqpxq “ JJφ pxq∇φ`pφq|φ“φpxq . (8)
With the soft-max loss `pxq “ ´fypxq`logřz exprfzpxqs
and in case of fy˚pxq " fzpxq one gets
∇φ`pφq “ wy˚ ´ wy “ ´4wy . (9)
This shows that a gradient-based iterative attack is closely
related to solving the pre-image problem for finding an opti-
mal feature perturbation via the Jacobian transpose method.
4.3. Approximate Rays and Adversarial Cones
If an adversary had direct control over the feature space
representation, optimal attack vectors could always be found
along the ray4wz . As the adversary has to work in input
space, this may only be possible in approximation however.
Experimentally, we have found that an optimal perturbation
typically defines a ray in input space, x ` t4x (t ě 0),
yielding a feature-space trajectory φptq “ φpx` t4xq for
which the rate of change along4wz is nearly constant over
a relevant range of t, see Figures 3 & 9. While the existence
of such rays obviously plays in the hand of an adversary, it
remains an open theoretical question to eluciate properties
of the model architecture causing such vulnerabilities.
As adversarial directions are expected to be suscpetible to
angular variations (otherwise they would be simple to find
and pointing at a general lack of model robustness), we
conjecture that geometrically optimal adversarial manipula-
tions are embedded in a cone-like structure, which we call
adversarial cone. Experimental evidence for the existence
of such cones is visualized in Figure 5. It is a virtue of
the commutativity of applying the adversarial4x and ran-
dom noise η that our statistical test can reliably detect such
adversarial cones.
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Table 1. Baseline test set accuracies on clean and PGD-perturbed
examples for the models we considered.
DATASET MODEL TEST SET ACCURACY
(CLEAN / PGD)
CIFAR10 WRESNET 96.2% / 2.60%
CNN7 93.8% / 3.91%
CNN4 73.5% / 14.5%
IMAGENET INCEPTION V3 76.5% / 7.2%
RESNET 101 77.0% / 7.2%
RESNET 18 69.2% / 6.5%
VGG11(+BN) 70.1% / 5.7%
VGG16(+BN) 73.3% / 6.1%
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Datasets, Architectures & Training Methods
In this section, we provide experimental support for our the-
oretical propositions and we benchmark our detection and
correction methods on various architectures of deep neural
networks trained on the CIFAR10 and ImageNet datasets.
For CIFAR10, we compare the WideResNet implementation
of Madry et al. (2017), a 7-layer CNN with batch normaliza-
tion and a vanilla 4-layer CNN. In the following, if nothing
else is specified, we use the 7-layer CNN as a default plat-
form, since it has good test set accuracy at relatively low
computational requirements. For ImageNet, we use a se-
lection of models from the torchvision package (Marcel &
Rodriguez, 2010), including Inception V3, ResNet101 and
VGG16. Further details can be found in the Appendix.
As a default attack strategy we use an L8-norm constrained
PGD white-box attack. The attack budget 8 was chosen
to be the smallest value such that almost all examples are
successfully attacked. For CIFAR10 this is 8 “ 8{255, for
ImageNet 8 “ 2{255. We experimented with a number of
different PGD iterations and found that the detection rate
and corrected classification accuracy are nearly constant
across the entire range from 10 up to 1000 attack iterations,
as shown in Figure 8 in the Appendix. For the remainder
of this paper, we thus fixed the number of attack iterations
to 20. Table 1 shows test set accuracies for all considered
models on both clean and adversarial samples.
We note that the detection test in Equation 5 as well as
the basic correction algorithm in Equation 6 are completely
attack agnostic. The only stage that explicitly includes an ad-
versarial attack model is the second-level logistic classifier
based correction algorithm, which is trained on adversari-
ally perturbed samples, as explained in Section 7.1 in the
Appendix. While this could in principle lead to overfitting
to the particular attacks considered, we empirically show
that the second-level classifier based correction algorithm
performs well under attacks not seen during training, cf.
Section 5.6, as well as specifically designed counter-attacks,
cf. Section 5.7.
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Figure 3. (Left) Norm of the induced feature space perturba-
tion along adversarial and random directions. (Right) Weight-
difference alignment. For the adversarial direction, the alignment
with the weight-difference between the true and adversarial class
is shown. For the random direction, the largest alignment with any
weight-difference vector is shown. See also Figure 8.
5.2. Detectability of Adversarial Examples
Induced feature space perturbations. We compare the
norm of the induced feature space perturbation ||4φ||2
along adversarial directions x˚`t4x with that along ran-
dom directions x˚` tη (where the expected norm of the
noise is set to be approximately equal to the expected norm
of the adversarial perturbation). We also compute the align-
ment x4φ,4wy between the induced feature space per-
turbation and certain weight-difference vectors: For the
adversarial direction, the alignment is computed w.r.t. the
weight-difference vector between the true and adversarial
class, for the random direction, the largest alignment with
any weight-difference vector is computed.
The results are reported in Figure 3. The plot on the left
shows that iterative adversarial attacks induce feature space
perturbations that are significantly larger than those induced
by random noise. The plot on the right shows that the attack-
induced weight-difference alignment is significantly larger
than the noise-induced one. The plot on the right in Fig-
ure 8 in the Appendix further shows that the noise-induced
weight-difference alignment is significantly larger for the
adversarial example than for the natural one. Combined, this
indicates that adversarial examples cause atypically large
feature space perturbations along the weight-difference di-
rection4wy “ wy ´ wy˚ , with y “ F pxq.
Distance to decision boundary. Next, we investigate how
the distance to the decision boundary for adversarial exam-
ples compares with that of their unperturbed counterpart.
To this end, we measure the logit cross-over when linearly
interpolating between an adversarially perturbed example
and its natural counterpart, i.e. we measure t P r0, 1s s.t.
fy˚px˚`t4xq » fypx˚`t4xq, where y “ F px˚`4xq.
We also measure the average L2-norm of the DeepFool
perturbation4xptq, required to cross the nearest decision
boundary1, for all interpolants xptq “ x˚`t4x.
1The DeepFool attack aims to find the shortest path to the
nearest decision boundary. We additionally augment DeepFool by
a binary search to hit the decision boundary precisely.
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Figure 4. Average distance to the decision boundary when interpo-
lating from natural examples to adversarial examples. The horizon-
tal axis shows the relative offset of the interpolant xptq to the logit
cross-over point located at the origin 0. For each interpolant xptq,
the distance to the nearest decision boundary is computed. The
plot shows that natural examples are slightly closer to the decision
boundary than adversarial examples.
We find that the mean logit cross-overs is at t¯ “ 0.43. Sim-
ilarly, as shown in Figure 4, the mean L2-distance to the
nearest decision boundary is 0.37 for adversarial examples,
compared to 0.27 for natural ones. Hence, natural examples
are even slightly closer to the decision boundary. We can
thus rule out the possibility that adversarial examples are
detectable because of a trivial discrepancy in distance to
the decision boundary.
Neighborhood of adversarial examples. We measure the
ratio of the ‘distance between the adversarial and the corre-
sponding unperturbed example’ to the ‘distance between the
adversarial example and the nearest other neighbor (in either
training or test set)’, i.e. we compute ||x´x˚||2{||x´xnn||2
over a number of samples in the test set, for various L8- &
L2-bounded PGD attacks (with 2 “
?
D8).
We consistently find that the ratio is sharply peaked around
a value much smaller than one. E.g. for L8-PGD attack
with 8“8{255 we get 0.075˘0.018, while for the corre-
sponding L2-PGD attack we obtain 0.088˘0.019. Further
values can be found in Table 7 in the Appendix. We note that
similar findings have been reported by Trame`r et al. (2017).
Hence, “perceptually similar” adversarial examples are
much closer to the unperturbed sample than to any other
neighbor in the training or test set.
We would therefore naturally expect that the feature repre-
sentation is more likely to be shifted to the original unper-
turbed class rather than any other neighboring class when
the adversarial example is convolved with random noise.
To investigate this further, we plot the softmax predictions
when adding noise to the adversarial example. The results
are reported in Figure 9 in the Appendix. The plot on the
left shows that the probability of the natural class increases
faster than the probability of the highest other class when
adding noise with a small to intermediate magnitude to
Figure 5. Adversarial cone. The plot shows the averaged softmax
prediction for the natural class over ambient space hyperplanes
spanned by the adversarial perturbation (on the vertical axis) and
randomly sampled orthogonal vectors (on the horizontal axis). The
natural sample is located one-third from the top, the adversarial
sample one third from the bottom on the vertical axis through the
middle of the plot.
the adversarial example. However, the probability of the
natural class never climbs to be the highest probability of
all classes, which is why simple addition of noise to an
adversarial example does not recover the natural class in
general.
Adversarial Cones. To visualize the ambient space neigh-
borhood around natural and adversarially perturbed samples,
we plot the averaged classifier prediction for the natural
class over hyperplanes spanned by the adversarial perturba-
tion and randomly sampled orthogonal vectors, i.e. we plot
EnrFy˚px˚` t4x` snqs for s P r´1, 1s, t P r´1, 2s with
s along the horizontal and t along the vertical axis, where
Fy˚ denotes the softmax and En denotes expectation over
random vectors n K 4x with approximately equal norm.
Interestingly, the plot reveals that adversarial examples are
embedded in a cone-like structure, i.e. the adversarial sam-
ple is statistically speaking “surrounded” by the natural
class, as can be seen from the gray rays confining the ad-
versarial cone. This confirms our theoretical argument that
the noise-induced feature variation tends to have a direc-
tion that is indicative of the natural class when the input is
adversarially perturbed.
It is a virtue of the commutativity of applying the adversarial
and random noise, i.e. x˚ `4x` η vs. x˚ ` η `4x, that
our method can reliably detect such adversarial cones.
5.3. Detection rates and classification accuracies
In the remainder of this section we present the results of
various performance evaluations. The reported detection
rates measure how often our method classifies a sample as
being adversarial, corresponding to the False Positive Rate
if the sample is clean and to the True Positive Rate if it
was perturbed. We also report accuracies for the predictions
made by the logistic classifier based correction method.
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Table 2. Detection rates of our statistical test.
DATASET MODEL DETECTION RATE
(CLEAN / PGD)
CIFAR10 WRESNET 0.2% / 99.1%
CNN7 0.8% / 95.0%
CNN4 1.4% / 93.8%
IMAGENET INCEPTION V3 1.9% / 99.6%
RESNET 101 0.8% / 99.8%
RESNET 18 0.6% / 99.8%
VGG11(+BN) 0.5% / 99.9%
VGG16(+BN) 0.3% / 99.9%
Table 3. Accuracies of our correction method.
DATASET MODEL ACCURACY
(CLEAN / PGD)
CIFAR10 WRESNET 96.0% / 92.7%
CNN7 93.6% / 89.5%
CNN4 71.0% / 67.6%
Tables 2 and 3 report the detection rates of our statistical
test and accuracies of the corrected predictions. Our method
manages to detect nearly all adversarial samples, seemingly
getting better as models become more complex, while the
false positive rate stays around 1%. Further2, our second-
level logistic-classifier based correction method manages
to reclassify almost all of the detected adversarial samples
to their respective source class successfully, resulting in
test set accuracies on adversarial samples within 5% of
the respective test set accuracies on clean samples. Also
note that due to the low false positive rate, the drop in
performance on clean samples is negligible.
5.4. Effective strength of adversarial perturbations.
We measure how the detection rate and reclassification accu-
racy of our method depend on the effective attack strength.
To this end, we define the effective Bernoulli-q strength of
-bounded adversarial perturbations as the attack success
rate when each entry of the perturbation4x is individually
accepted with probability q and set to zero with probability
1´ q. For q “ 1 we obtain the usual adversarial misclassifi-
cation rate. We naturally expect weaker attacks to be less
effective but also harder to detect than stronger ones.
The results are reported in Figure 6. We can see that the
uncorrected accuracy of the classifier decreases monotoni-
cally as the effective attack strength increases, both in terms
of the attack budget 8 as well as in term of the fraction q
of accepted perturbation entries. Meanwhile, the detection
rate of our method increases at such a rate that the corrected
classifier manages to compensate for the decay in uncor-
rected accuracy, due to the decrease in effective strength of
the perturbations, across the entire range considered.
2Due to computational constraints, we focus on the CIFAR10
models in the remainder of this paper.
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Figure 6. Detection rate and reclassification accuracy as a function
of the effective attack strength. The uncorrected classifier accuracy
decreases as the attack strength increases, both in terms of the
attack budget 8 as well as in terms of the fraction q of accepted
perturbation entries. Meanwhile, the detection rate of our method
increases at such a rate that the corrected classifier manages to
compensate for the decay in uncorrected accuracy.
Table 4. Test set accuracies for adversarially trained models.
DATASET ADVERSARIALLY ACCURACY
TRAINED MODEL (CLEAN / PGD)
CIFAR10 WRESNET 87.3% / 55.2%
CNN7 82.2% / 44.4%
CNN4 68.2% / 40.4%
5.5. Comparison to Adversarial Training
For comparison, we also report test set and white-box at-
tack accuracies for adversarially trained models. Madry
et al. (2017)’s WResNet was available as an adversarially
pretrained variant, while the other models were adversar-
ially trained as outlined in Section 7.1 in the Appendix.
The results for the best performing classifiers are shown in
Table 4. We can see that the accuracy on adversarial sam-
ples is significantly lower while the drop in performance
on clean samples is considerably larger for adversarially
trained models compared to our method.
5.6. Defending against unseen attacks
Next, we evaluate our method on adversarial examples cre-
ated by attacks that are different from the L8-constrained
PGD attack used to train the second-level logistic classifier.
The rationale is that the log-odds statistics of the unseen
attacks could be different from the ones used to train the
logistic classifier. We thus want to test whether it is possible
to evade correct reclassification by switching to a different
attack. As alternative attacks we use an L2-constrained
PGD attack as well as the L2-Carlini-Wagner attack.
The baseline accuracy of the undefended CNN7 on adversar-
ial examples is 4.8% for the L2-PGD attack and 3.9% for
the Carlini-Wagner attack. Table 5 shows the detection rates
and corrected classification accuracies of our method. As
can be seen, there is only a slight decrease in performance,
i.e. our method remains capable of detecting and correcting
most adversarial examples of the previously unseen attacks.
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Table 5. CIFAR10 detection rates and reclassification accuracies
on adversarial samples from attacks that have not been used to
train the second-level logistic classifier.
ATTACK DETECTION RATE ACCURACY
(CLEAN / ATTACK) (CLEAN / ATTACK)
L2-PGD 1.0% / 96.1% 93.3% / 92.9%
L2- CW 4.8% / 91.6% 89.7% / 77.9%
Table 6. CIFAR10 detection rates and reclassification accuracies
on clean and adversarial samples from the defense-aware attacker.
MODEL DETECTION RATE ACCURACY
(CLEAN / ATTACK) (CLEAN / ATTACK)
WRESNET 4.5% / 71.4% 91.7% / 56.0%
CNN7 2.8% / 75.5% 91.2% / 56.6%
CNN4 4.1% / 81.3% 69.0% / 56.5%
5.7. Defending against defense-aware attacks
Finally, we evaluate our method in a setting where the at-
tacker is fully aware of the defense, in order to see if the de-
fended network is susceptible to cleverly designed counter-
attacks. Since our defense is built on random sampling from
noise sources that are under our control, the attacker will
want to craft perturbations that perform well in expectation
under this noise. The optimality of this strategy in the face
of randomization-based defenses was established in Carlini
& Wagner (2017a) (cf. their recipe to attack the dropout
randomization defense of Feinman et al. (2017)). Specifi-
cally, each PGD perturbation is computed for a loss function
that is an empirical average over K “ 100 noise-convolved
data points, with the same noise source as used for detec-
tion. (We have also experimented with other variants such
as backpropagating through our statistical test and found the
above approach by Carlini & Wagner (2017a) to work best.)
The undefended accuracies under this attack for the models
under consideration are: WResNet 2.8%, CNN7 3.6% and
CNN4 14.5%. Table 6 shows the corresponding detection
rates and accuracies after defending with our method. Com-
pared to Section 5.6, the drop in performance is larger, as we
would expect for a defense-aware counter-attack, however,
both the detection rates and the corrected accuracies remain
remarkably high compared to the undefended network.
5.8. Comparison with related detection methods
In this last section we provide a quantitative comparison
with two of the leading detection methods: feature squeez-
ing of Xu et al. (2017) and dropout randomization (aka
Bayesian neural network uncertainty) of Feinman et al.
(2017). The reason we compare against those two is that
Carlini & Wagner (2017a) consider dropout randomization
to be the only defense, among the ten methods they surveyed
(including the other two detection methods we mentioned
in more detail in the related work section), that is not com-
pletely broken, while the more recent feature squeezing
method was selected because it was evaluated extensively
on comparable settings to ours.
On CIFAR10, feature squeezing3 (DenseNet) significantly
enhances the model robustness against L2-CW attacks,
while it is considerably less effective against PGD attacks,
which the authors suspect could due to feature squeezing
being better suited to mitigating smaller perturbations. For
L2-CW attacks, they report a detection rate of 100% (FPR
ă 5%) and corrected accuracies of 89% on clean and 83%
on adversarial examples, which is slightly better than our
numbers in Table 5. We would like to note however that we
calibrated our method on L8-constrained perturbations and
that our numbers could probably be improved by calibrat-
ing on L2-constrained perturbations instead. For L8-PGD,
feature squeezing achieves a detection rate of 55% (FPR
ă 5%), with corrected accuracies of 89% on clean and 56%
on adversarial examples, whereas our method achieves a
detection rate of 99% (FPR ă 1%), with accuracies of 96%
on clean and 92% on adversarial samples respectively. On
ImageNet, feature squeezing (MobileNet) achieves a detec-
tion rate of 64% (FPR 5%) for L8-PGD, while our method
achieves a detection rate of 99% (FPR 1%). Xu et al. (2017)
only evaluate feature squeezing against defense-aware at-
tacks on MNIST, finding that their method is not immune.
Feinman et al. (2017) do not report individual true and false
detection rates. They do however show the ROC curve and
report its AUC: compare their BIM-B curve (PGD with fixed
number of iterations) in Figures 9c & 10 with our Figure 10
in the Appendix. On CIFAR10 (ResNet) Carlini & Wagner
(2017a) were able to fool the dropout defense with 98%
success, i.e. the detection rate is 2% for the defense-aware
L2-CW attack. Our method achieves a detection rate of
71.4% (FPR 4.5%) in a comparable setting.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that adversarial examples exist in cone-like
regions in very specific directions from their corresponding
natural examples. Based on this, we design a statistical
test of a given sample’s log-odds robustness to noise that
can predict with high accuracy if the sample is natural or
adversarial and recover its original class label, if necessary.
Further research into the properties of network architec-
tures is necessary to explain the underlying cause of this
phenomenon. It remains an open question which current
model families follow this paradigm and whether criteria
exist which can certify that a given model is immunizable
via our method.
3We report their best joint detection ensemble of squeezers.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Experiments.
Further details regarding the implementation:
Details on the models used. All models on ImageNet are
taken as pretrained versions from the torchvision4 python
package. For CIFAR10, both CNN75 as well as WResNet6
are available on GitHub as pretrained versions. The CNN4
model is a standard convolutional network with layers of
32, 32, 64 and 64 channels, each using 3 ˆ 3 filters and
each layer being followed by a ReLU nonlinearity and 2ˆ 2
MaxPooling. The final layer is fully connected.
Training procedures. We used pretrained versions of all
models except CNN4, which we trained for 50 epochs with
RMSProp and a learning rate of 0.0001. For adversarial
training, the models were trained for 50, 100 and 150 epochs
using mixed batches of clean and corresponding adversarial
(PGD) samples, matching the respective training schedule
and optimizer settings of the clean models. We report results
for the best performing variant. The exception to this is the
WResNet model, for which an adversarially trained version
was already available.
Setting the thresholds. The thresholds τy,z are set such
that our statistical test achieves the highest possible detec-
tion rate (aka True Positive Rate) at a prespecified False
Positive Rate of less than 1% (5% for Sections 5.6 and 5.7),
computed on a hold-out set of natural and adversarially
perturbed samples.
Determining attack strengths. For the adversarial attacks
we consider, we can choose multiple parameters to influ-
ence the strength of the attack. Usually, as attack strength
increases, at some point there is a sharp increase in the frac-
tion of samples in the dataset where the attack is successful.
We chose our attack strength such that it is the lowest value
after this increase, which means that it is the lowest value
such that the attack is able to successfully attack most of the
datapoints. Note that weaker attacks generate adversarial
samples that are closer to the original samples, which makes
them harder to detect than excessively strong attacks.
Noise sources. Adding noise provides a non-atomic view,
probing the classifiers output in an entire neighborhood
around the input. In practice we sample noise from a mix-
ture of different sources: Uniform, Bernoulli and Gaussian
noise with different magnitudes. The magnitudes are sam-
pled from a log-scale. For each noise source and magnitude,
we draw 256 samples as a base for noisy versions of the
incoming datapoints, although we have not observed a large
drop in performance using only the single best combina-
4https://github.com/pytorch/vision
5https://github.com/aaron-xichen/pytorch-playground
6https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10 challenge
tion of noise source and magnitude and using less samples,
which speeds up the wall time used to classify a single sam-
ple by an order of magnitude. For detection, we test the
sample in question against the distribution of each noise
source, then we take a majority vote as to whether the sam-
ple should be classified as adversarial.
Plots. All plots containing shaded areas have been repeated
over the dataset. In these plots, the line indicates the mean
measurement and the shaded area represents one standard
deviation around the mean.
Wall time performance. Since for each incoming sample
at test time, we have to forward propagate a batch ofN noisy
versions through the model, the time it takes to classify a
sample in a robust manner using our method scales linearly
with N compared to the same model undefended. The rest
of our method has negligible overhead. At training time,
we essentially have to do perform the same operation over
the training dataset, which, depending on its size and the
number of desired noise sources, can take a while. For a
given model and dataset, this has to be performed only once
however and the computed statistics can then be stored.
7.2. Logistic classifier for reclassification.
Instead of selecting class z according to Eq. (6), we found
that training a simple logistic classifier that gets as input
all the K ´ 1 Z-scores g¯y,zpxq for z P t1, ..,Kuzy can
further improve classification accuracy, especially in cases
where several Z-scores are comparably far above the thresh-
old. Specifically, for each class label y, we train a separate
logsitic regression classifier Cy such that if a sample x of
predicted class y is detected as adversarial, we obtain the
corrected class label as z “ Cypxq. These classifiers are
trained on the same training data that is used to collect the
statistics for detection. Two points are worth noting: First,
as the classifiers are trained using adversarial samples from
a particular adversarial attack model, they might not be valid
for adversarial samples from other attack models. However,
we confirm experimentally that our classifiers (trained using
PGD) do generalize well to other attacks. Second, build-
ing a classifier in order to protect a classifier might seem
tautological, because this metaclassifier could now become
the target of an adversarial attack itself. However, this does
not apply in our case, as the inputs to the metaclassifier are
(i) low-dimensional (there are just K´1 weight-difference
alignments for any given sample), (ii) based on sampled
noise and therefore random variables and (iii) the classi-
fier itself is shallow. All of these make it much harder to
specifically attack the corrected classifier. In Section 5.7
we show that our method performs reasonably well even if
the adversary is fully aware (has perfect knowledge) of the
defense.
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7.3. Additional results mentioned in the main text.
Figure 7. Noise-induced change of logit scores fy (on the vertical
axis) and fz (on the horizontal axis). Different plots correspond
to different classes z P t1, ..,Kuzy. The light red dot shows an
adversarially perturbed example x without noise. The other red
dots show the adversarially perturbed example with added noise.
Color shades reflect noise magnitude: light “ small, dark “ large
magnitude. The light blue dot indicates the corresponding natural
example without noise. The candidate class z in the upper-left
corner is selected. See Figure 1 for an explanation.
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Figure 8. (Left) Detection rates and accuracies vs. number of PGD
iterations. (Right) Noise-induced weight-difference alignment
along x˚`tη and x`tη respectively. For the adversarial example,
the alignment with the weight-difference vector between the true
and adversarial class is shown. For the natural example, the largest
alignment with any weight-difference vector is shown.
Table 7. Proximity to nearest neighbor. The table shows the ratio
of the ‘distance between the adversarial and the corresponding
unperturbed example’ to the ‘distance between the adversarial
example and the nearest other neighbor (in either training or test
set)’, i.e. ||x´ x˚||2{||x´ xnn||2.
PGD 8“2 8“4 8“8
L8 0.021˘ 0.005 0.039˘ 0.010 0.075˘ 0.018
L2 0.023˘ 0.006 0.043˘ 0.012 0.088˘ 0.019
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Figure 9. (Left) Softmax predictions Fypx` tηq when adding ran-
dom noise to the adversarial example. (Right) Softmax predictions
Fypx˚ ` t∆xq along the ray from natural to adversarial example
and beyond. For the untargeted attack shown here, the probability
of the source class stays low, even at t “ 10.
7.4. ROC Curves.
Figure 10 shows how our method performs against a PGD
attack under different settings of thresholds τ .
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Figure 10. ROC-curves. Test set accuracies and detection rates on
clean and PGD-perturbed samples for a range of thresholds τ on
CIFAR10.
